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«[The Rochdale co-operative experi­
ments]., .showed that associations of work­
men could manage shops, mills, and 
almost all forms of industry with suc­
cess, and they immediately improved 
the conditions of the men, but then 
they did not leave a clear place for 
masters. Quelle horreurh 
(from the Spectator, as quoted in Karl 
Marx, Das Kapital, V. I, p. 331 fn.)
I. introduction
This essay is motivated by what appears to be 
an increasing social awareness of worker dissat­
isfaction in modern industrial societies [7; 8; 
11; 15; 23; 49; 59] and by current discussions 
of worker dissatisfaction and of workers’ control 
in the radical economic literature [7; 8; 9; 10; 
11; 13; 19; 21; 22; 23; 27; 52], Such discussions 
quite often focus on the central role of the hier­
archical division of labor in the contemporary work 
environment. A broad range of alternatives has 
been proposed in many countries. Although it might 
be argued that political considerations would weigh 
heavily (if not solely) on the decision, practical­
ly, social scientists are asked to assist in the eva­
luation of alternatives. The methodological tools 
employed in such evaluation tasks are of decisive 
importance. It is this «practical» problem with which 
the paper is concerned. In doing so it essentially 
comprises a critical reconsideration of the neo­
classical theory of the firm. At the same time, this 
work reveals a virtual lack of any influence on neo­
classical economic orthodoxy by the movement for 
workers’ control. This movement has demonstrated 
the strength of the relation ship between the qual­
ity of the work environment and the social rela­
tions of the work place on the one hand, and wor­
ker dissatisfaction, on the other.
This essay is neither comprehensive in its re­
view of the literature, nor original. It can be des­
cribed best as a review paper aiming at a synthe­
sis. It draws substantially from Gintis [20] and 
Bowles and Gintis [10] to argue the critical impor­
tance of the «explicit power» which is left in the hands 
of employers. The hierarchical division of labor 
as an organizational form is seen as the institu­
tional framework for such power. The question of 
the «optimal» organizational form is addressed
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in terms of both the notion of economic efficiency 
and concepts in the technical literature of organi­
zation and information economics [3; 12; 28; 29; 
30; 35; 36; 41; 45].
A summary of the remainder of the paper would 
go as follows. First, we trace the origin of the neo­
classical theory of the firm in the writings of Coase 
and Simon. Second, we discuss how the hierarchi­
cal division of labor fits into the logic of the theory 
of the firm. Third, we contest a specific implica­
tion of the neoclassical position, namely that con­
temporary work organization conforms to worker 
preferences. Fourth, we review selectively some 
relevant classical writings by Adam Smith, 
Charles Babbage, and Karl Marx. Fifth, after re­
viewing some refinements of the neoclassical po­
sition we identify the element of power as central 
to the organization of the workplace. Sixth, we 
probe the relevance of the methodological tools 
employed by recent literature on mechanisms of 
resource allocation. This literature regards the in­
stitutional framework as an unknown rather than 
a datum. Seventh, we offer a link between critical 
views about the theory of the firm (such as the 
ones which are maintained in this essay), and con­
crete aspects of economic reality. That is, the re­
lationship between work organization and income 
distribution.
We hope that such a synthetic review of the lit­
erature would be of interest even outside the dis­
cipline of economics. For the issues go much 
beyond such narrow boundaries. As we mentioned 
right at the outset, the question of how to enhance 
the quality of the work environment and to dem­
ocratize the work place is ultimately political. 
The nature of the relationship between efficiency, 
income distribution, and control at the level of the 
productive enterprise seems to be a fundamental 
factor in the resolution of pertinent political ques­
tions. We have not, however, included overtly po­
litical considerations within the scope of this es- 
say-albeit, they underlie most of our arguments.
II. origins and interpretations of the neoclassical
theory of the firm
R. Coase in his influential paper on the theory 
of the firm [14] gives a rigorous explanation of 
why authoritarian forms of economic organiza­
tion—«islands of conscious power,» [14, p. 388] 
where «the direction of resources is dependent on 
an entrepreneur,» [14, p. 292]—supersede market 
exchange. The explanation rests on the existence 
of costs of operating in a market system (collect­
ing information about prices, arranging con­
tracts, etc.) upon which savings can be made by
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setting up a firm. But from the point of view of 
what particular jobs involve, contracts are ad­
mittedly vague, «...the exact details being left until a 
later date. All that is stated in the contract is the 
limits to what the persons supplying the commod­
ity or service is expected to do. The details... 
(are) decided later by the purchaser.» [14, p. 392] 
Coase seems to believe that this is due to excessive 
costs of continuous short-term contracting.
H. Simon in [46] gives a formal description of 
the employment relationship: Let B be the em­
ployer, W the employee, and A the set of all spe­
cific actions W would perform if employed by B; 
B is seen to exercise authority over W if W permits 
B to select x, x ε A, and an employment relation­
ship obtains if W accepts the authority of B and B 
is willing to pay W an agreed-upon wage. Simon 
also gives an elegant, but somewhat primitive, model 
for the choice between an employment contract and 
a sales contract.1
Once the employment relationship has been 
specified then the neoclassical theory of the firm 
assumes that labor inputs may be treated sym­
metrically with other inputs. Clearly, the organi­
zation of the labor input has to comply with the pro­
fit maximization objective. More specifically, ac­
cording to the theory, profit maximization1 im­
plies that organizational forms which are chosen 
are efficient. In particular, job design chosen is 
efficient and although this theorem is usually con­
strued in a narrow technical sense, as Gintis points 
out [20; p. 3], a bona fide interpretation of the 
neoclassical view is that worker preferences over 
characteristics of the work environment should 
also be included. Thus, construed as an extension 
of consumer sovereignty, «worker sovereignty» 
is seen to prevail; namely job structures and 
wages reflect workers’ trade-offs place between pe­
cuniary remuneration and job satisfaction. That is, 
inefficient organizational forms will weed out over 
time (in the process of competition as new forms 
replace older ones) provided that no externali­
ties are present).
The advantages of the minute division of labor, 
were first expounded by Adam Smith in a famous 
passage [48, p. 7]: «This great increase of the
I. Simon argues that the former is the subject of adminis­
trative theory and the latter of economic theory. Such a 
dichotomy is untenable since in a world of perfect mobi­
lity, and over time, workers can move around and firms can 
alter organizational forms in response to market conditions. 
See also how he contrasts the theory of the firm (F-theory) 
and the theory of organization (O-theory) in [47],
2. We may leave temporarily aside the issue of whether 
this is construed over the short—or the long-run. This has 
important political and economic implications. See Marglin 
[34], Gorz [21;24],
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quantity of work, which, in consequence of the di­
vision of labor, the same number of people are 
capable of performing, is owning to three different 
circumstances; first, to the increase of dexter­
ity in every particular workman; secondly, to the 
saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing 
from one species of work to another; and lastly, 
to the invention of a great number of machines 
which facilitate and abridge labor, and enable 
one man to do the work of many.» This consti­
tutes, an essential component of the usual defense 
of the hierarchical organization of production which 
goes as follows [21; 23; 24]: technical efficiency 
implies minute division of labor and for coordi­
nation, hierarchical division of labor is needed.
Yet, the economic efficiency aspects of work 
organization in contemporary industrial societies 
have been attacked from several directions. First 
of all, as Marglin [34] and others have pointed 
out, Adam Smith later develops some severe 
criticism of his own for the minute division of la­
bor: «The man whose whole life is spent in per­
forming a few simple operations... becomes as 
stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human 
creature to become.» [48, p. 734]. Second, the 
worker dissatisfaction which is reported now­
adays can be translated into some form of concrete 
criticism of the minute decision of labor and, by 
implication, of the neoclassical theory of the firm. 
The collection of (albeit indirect) evidence [7; 
15; 21; 22; 33; 34; 49; 59] against the efficiency 
of contemporary work organization is impressive. 
As Blumberg points out, findings of such con­
sistency are rare in social research [7, p. 121]. Third, 
some of the arguments in Work in America [58] 
contend that not only the organization of work is 
inefficient (in the strict economic sense) but also 
that the hierarchical organization of production— 
the most prevalent type of job design—is actually 
technically inefficient. Fourth, the experimental lit­
erature from industrial social psychology does 
not support the usual defense of the hierarchical 
division of labor. As reported by Vroom [51], 
worker participation in decision-making improves 
productivity. At the same time, as Gintis points 
out, «however the hierarchical structure of power 
fits into the logic of profit maximization, task frag­
mentation will follow as a result. All that we can de­
rive from this experimental literature (Vroom, ibid). 
is that if centralized control is posited, then Adam 
Smith’s minute division of labor will be relatively 
more productive.» [20, p. 6].
We will not pursue these complex questions fur­
ther. Instead we add some words of caution. Facts like 
the ones reported in Work in America cannot be 
easily interpreted outside particular social science
disciplines, and at any rate since it is hard to have 
an objective measure of human welfare a degree 
of ambiguity will always remain. At the same time 
a historical perspective is indispensable for a cor­
rect interpretation of scientific propositions. The 
factory system—with its foremen, its manager, and 
its minute division of labor—did not come into exis­
tence overnight. In this context, Marglin’s study 
[34] of the origins and functions of hierarchy in 
capitalist production is very significant in that it 
is primarily historical. Marglin argues that the 
factory system did not prevail because it was supe­
rior on grounds of efficiency; it prevailed because 
it facilitated control over the process of production 
and investment. We do not intend to duplicate 
such historical analyses, yet the study of classical 
commentators provides useful reference points. For 
concrete examples we may now turn to Charles Bab­
bage and Karl Marx.
An interesting observation about how the di­
vision of labor affects productive efficiency was 
made by Charles Babbage [4, p. 109]: «The mas­
ter manufacturer by dividing the work to be exe­
cuted into different processes, each requiring dif­
ferent degrees of skills and force, can purchase 
exactly that precise quantity of both that is neces­
sary for each process; whereas if the whole work 
were executed by one workman, that person must 
possess sufficient skill to perform the most dif­
ficult and sufficient strength to execute the most 
laborious of the operations into which the work is 
divided.» [4, p. 190].
This was noted by A. Marshall [37, p. 224; 
38] but, as Braverman [11] correctly points out, 
it seems that economic thinking on the subject 
since then has not been influenced by rhe «Bab­
bage principle.» If anything, Braverman argues, the 
Babbage principle has been misused in the defense 
of the process by which «the capitalist mode of 
production systematically destroys all-around skills 
where they exist, and brings into being skills 
and occupations that correspond to its needs.» 
[Ibid., p. 82]. The process by which labor power— 
the commodity—is cheapened, by being broken up, 
goes hand-in-hand with the social division of 
labor. If this is true, then the historical develop­
ment of economic structures have consolidated the 
employers’ control of the work process. This power 
is derived from the minute division of labor and 
the associate hierarchical form of control.
Before we return to the critique of the neoclas­
sical theory of the firm we should make a note of 
Marx’s view on these issues as well. Contrary to 
Marglin’s assertions in his study of the origin and 
functions of hiérarchie in capitalist production 
[34] a reading of Capital V. 1. generates the opinion
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that Karl Marx was at least ambivalent about the 
origins of hierarchical organization of production. 
E.g. he argues that a central directing authority 
is needed yet he presents evidence that coope­
rative experiments can work—«Quelle horreur.» He 
recognizes the Babbage principle and quotes the 
same passage as Marshall but goes further in ex­
plaining its importance—in a way anticipating the 
impact of scientific management. «Every process 
of production, however, requires certain simple 
manipulations, which every man is capable of doing. 
They too are now severed from their connection 
with the more pregnant moments of activity and 
ossified into exclusive functions of specially appoint­
ed laborers. Hence, Manufacture begets, in every 
handicraft that it seizes upon, a class of so-called 
unskilled laborers... If it develops a one-side spe­
cialty into a perfection, at the expense of the 
whole of a man’s working capacity, it also begins 
to make a specialty of the absence of all develop­
ment. Alongside of the hierarchic gradation there 
steps the simple separation of the laborers into 
skilled and unskilled.» [40, p. 350, emphasis added]. 
He also notes the important role played by middle 
-level supervisory personnel [Ibid., p. 332],
Regarding the effects of the division of labor, 
he was much clearer, although still undecided. «The 
one-sidedness and the deficiencies of the detail 
laborer become perfections... The habit of doing 
only one thing converts him into a never failing 
instrument...» (emph. add.). He also employs Adam 
Smith’s familiar self-criticism of the minute division 
of labor, op. cit. Finally, regarding the «noble achieve­
ment of Arkwright» he says «'order’ was want­
ing in manufacture based on 'the scholastic dogma 
of division of labor’ and 'Arkwright created order’.»
But with regards to working conditions Marx 
was, of course, very emphatic: «The miserable 
routine of endless drudgery and toil in which the 
same mechanical process is gone through over and 
over again, is like the labor of Sisyphus... The fac­
tory work exhausts the nervous system to the 
uttermost... and confiscates every atom of free­
dom, both in bodily and intellectual activity.» [40, 
p. 422-423],
Much current theory depends on foundations 
laid out by R. Coase and H. Simon. Among those 
who have built on neoclassical foundations Al- 
chian and Demsetz [1] should be emphasized. They 
present the essence of the firm as «a contractual 
structure with: [1] joint-input production; [2] several 
input owners; [3] one party who is common to all 
the contracts of the joint inputs; [4] who has 
rights to renegotiate any input’s contract inde­
pendently of contracts with other input owners;
[5] who holds the residual claim; and [6] who has 
the right to sell his central contractual residual 
status» [1, p. 794]. In addition they argue that no 
authoritarian control is involved and «the arrange­
ment [i. e. the firm] is simply a contractual struc­
ture subject to continuous renegotiation with the 
central agent» [1. p. 794]. The firm is viewed as a 
«privately owned market» and, in fact, a mar­
ket that is efficient at distributing the flow of infor­
mation about marketwide possibilities. This rather 
ironic view topped by a view of the economy as an 
arena where «private proprietary markets» compete 
with «public or communal markets»1 stands in sharp 
constrast with evidence in [7; 13; 15; 59], with 
the theory of internal labor markets [18]—inci- 
dently, another awkward use of the term «market»— 
with theories of wage determination (including 
«sociological» ones [42], and the sociology of work 
[6; 27; 23]).
From a different perspective, Williamson [55 ; 
56] argues in favor of applying a generalized theory 
of market failure to the evaluation of different modes 
of internal economic organization. He sees that the 
interesting problems of economic organization «are 
mainly to be explained by reference to the con­
junction of a set of human attributes with a re­
lated set of (largely nontechnological) transactional 
factors.» [56, p. 316]. The former include bounded 
rationality (the constrained capacity of human 
beings to deal with information) and opportun­
ism. Transactional factors include uncertainty, 
the effect of small numbers, and information im- 
pactedness (informational asymmetry coupled with 
differential costs for attaining information pari­
ty). Williamson argues that individual organiza­
tions give way to collective organizations of the 
peer group association type so that they may take 
advantage of indivisibilities and risk-bearing, but 
productivity gains are even possible because of 
pure associational reasons. That is, «by mobi­
lizing energies which, even if they could be moni­
tored costlessly and priced accordingly, could not 
be exacted in the market by the assured prospect 
of pecuniary reward» [56, p. 321]. Such associa­
tions of workers are nonhierarchical and cooper­
ative, involve some type of income sharing arrange­
ment, but «do not entail subordination.» Individ­
uals may also seek such associations for insurance 
purposes, and thus obtain insurance in a way supe­
rior to what the market would provide. Adverse 
selection («due to ex ante information impactedness») 
can be avoided and malingering and other ex post
1. «Could it be that the market suffers from the defects 
of communal property rights in organizing and influencing 
uses of valuable resources?» Ibid.., p. 795.
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manifestations of moral hazard can be checked.
The disadvantages, however, may be important: 
first, Williamson argues, efficient utilization of 
indivisible assets may be hampered. Although an 
efficient rule for simultaneous utilization may be a- 
greed upon and implemented collectively, an hierarchi­
cal solution would be simpler.1 Second, peer-group 
associations are vulnerable to free-rider types of 
problems such as in individuals’ withholding in­
formation about productivity. «To the extent that 
the cost of ex ante screening is high in relation to 
ex post experience rating, where the latter involves 
hierarchy, peer group organization is perforce 
limited» [55, p. 322]. This, however, is hardly ob­
vious.2 Third, hierarchies, it is argued, can better 
cope with malingering. Clearly this argument strongly 
depends on social values and it is crucial to the is­
sue of work motivation in collectivist situations— 
especially when needs and «internal justice» are im­
portant determinants of labor remuneration.
A. K. Sen has dealt with this issue of work mo­
tivation in game-theoretic terms [43;44]. He ar­
gues that in terms of a «Prisoner’s Dilemma» mod­
el where each party prefers not working hard to 
working hard, regardless of whether or not every­
body else is working hard each party, would pre­
fer everyone working hard to no one working hard. 
In such situations everyone ends up not working 
hard [44, p. 97]. Since it would be difficult to en­
force a collective contract, material incentives may 
be employed. On the other hand, a small variation 
on the «Prisoner’s Dilemma» game reveals its 
specific cultural bias. This variation produces the 
assurance game [43;44, p. 96]. According to this 
alternative model «each party would work hard 
given the assurance that others would too but 
would prefer not to put in the effort if the others 
would not.» In such situations where people’s val­
ues reflect mutual confidence, and an optimal 
solution is arrived at. As A.K.Sen points out, 
people would be better off even in terms of their 
own preferences if they behaved «as if their pre­
ferences were as in the Assurance Game» [44, p. 
98]. It is worth noting the significance if this simple 
argument (which links socialization at large and so­
cial organization in the work place) in considering 
the social feasibility of industrial democracy.
1. «[How] much simpler [!] if instrumental rules were to 
be imposed authoritatively...though the “leader” in these 
circumstances may merely be the first among equals.» Ibid,., 
p. 321.
2. See Arrow [2], Bowles and Gintis [9;10] and Jencks
[31] for the economic functions of education. Whether the 
schooling system developed in response to business’s demand 
for screening-signalling function is, of course, an impor­
tant question.
To summarize now, a fundamental tenet of the 
neoclassical theory of the firm in its pure form is 
that once the employment relationship has been spe­
cified then (as far as economic theory goes) labor in­
puts can be treated symmetrically with other in­
puts. Gintis in his discussion of the Coase-Simon 
position contrasts that labor is not supplied in such 
an autonomous fashion. Labor must be extracted 
from workers, and much that is implicit in labor con­
tracts must be enforced by political authority with­
in the firm. «The power to enforce the intent of the 
exchange lies within the jurisdiction of the actors— 
namely, in the organization of the firm itself. Thus 
power configurations between employer and em­
ployee are resultants of economic organization, and 
cannot be taken as given prior to economic analysis. 
On this point the neoclassical theory of the firm 
founders.» [19, p. 19].
III. hierarchies and macromcchanisms of resource
allocation
Having reviewed the theory of the firm in its 
various versions we now suggest that elements of the 
theory of mechanisms of resource allocation may 
be useful analytical tools. Before we proceed with this 
task, we may summarize here Williamson’s ar­
guments in favor of hierarchies. This would pro­
vide a helpful contrast since his models—contrary 
to those reviewed below—fail to deal adequately 
with the essentially asymmetrical nature of hierar­
chical relations (superior vs. subordinate).
Williamson’s arguments in favor of hierarchies 
may be summarized as follows: Peer group or col­
lectivist associations enjoy the advantages of pro­
ductivity through higher motivation, of economies 
of scale, and of risk-bearing, but hierarchies de­
crease the costs of communication and joint de­
cision-making and may better implement audit 
and experience-rating mechanisms. It is clear, 
however, that the issue of worker motivation is rather 
complex and yields no definitive answer. The argu­
ment regarding the cost of communicating is con­
vincing, and can be easily illustrated:
The number of channels of communication for
n individuals in a pairwise fashion is —~ while
with an intermediary the number is equal to n-1. 
Hence, what is needed—depending on the technol­
ogy of information—is an intermediary, a posi­
tion that does not imply a superior-subordinate 
relation and can be staffed on a rotational basis. 
We do not, of course, want to downgrade the im­
portant role expertise plays. The technology of
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information would play a role in the selection1 2 * *of 
organizational forms.
The fairly recent literature on mechanisms of 
resource allocation is best reviewed by L. Hurwicz 
[28]. Although it is cast in terms of the requirements 
of large-scale planning «this new approach refuses 
to accept the institutional status quo of a particular 
time and place as the only legitimate object of interest 
and yet recognizes constraints that disqualify naive 
utopias» [lbid,., p. 11]. It is precisely for these reasons 
that this approach may be applied to the theory 
of the firm. Organizations, however, are very complex 
structures and thus analysts often concentrate on 
their «viable» (equilibrium) states without assuming 
the absence of conflicts. From among different 
organizational structures there has been greater 
interest in those which are incentive-compatible.* 
In such structures no participant would gain by 
departing from his (assigned) behavior pattern if 
others do not.
It turns out that in structures which contain 
superior-subordinate relations individuals generally 
can gain by cheating «without openly violating 
the rules. A participant could try to cheat by doing 
what the rules would have required him to do, had 
his characteristics been different from what they are» 
[28, p. 23]. As Hurwicz puts it [Ibid., p. 24] this 
«has been recognized in connection with situa­
tions where targets and norms are set, whether for 
an enterprise in a Soviet-type economy or for 
workers on a piece rate under capitalism. In all of 
these cases there is a 'superior’ and a 'subordi­
nate,’ and the latter has an incentive to depress the 
norms when the penalty for failure to reach a tar­
get is severe.» In the presence of informational 
asymmetry among participants, it is natural to
1. This is also pointed out by Hurwicz [28] and many of 
the writers whose work is reviewed there. In particular, see 
Camacho [12, p. 65].
2. The notion of incentive-compatibility is formalized by
reference to the game-theoretic concept of Nash equilib­
rium [28; 29; 30, p. 23].
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inquire whether there can be optimal structures 
with associated reward systems which entail out­
put sharing. That is, in the optimal combination of 
observation of subordinate, of authority delega­
tion, and of a reward system efficiency gains from 
output sharing may outweigh loss to the superior 
from such sharing.
In fact, Hurwicz works out an example where the 
incentive structure is such that the superior can 
gain by misrepresenting the production characteris­
tics while the subordinate is paid the value of his 
marginal product. In such a case,8 output sharing 
would elicit optimal performance. Informational 
asymmetry usually takes the following form: a subor­
dinate possesses more detailed information about 
his own productive possib’lities and a superior 
knows better how subordinate fit into the entire 
operation. This example, however simple, does sug­
gest efficiency, gains from output sharing are plau­
sible, even before worker preferences over work 
activities and the value from participation in de­
cision-making are considered.
The views we express in this section constitute 
a technocratic dimension of the issues. There are 
also political and social dimensions. The work­
place is a political milieu with social relations 
much too complex to be easily circumscribed. The 
technocratic approach helps to narrow tik issues 
(and, perhaps, define them more clearly) and thus 
it facilitates analysis; yet it carries elements of 
bias. It is only social exprerimentation and politi­
cal pratice that may provide a way out of this «di­
lemma».
3. The example from Hurwicz [29 ; p. 25] goes as follows: 
A farmer produces by employing a worker. The farmer seeks 
to maximize output net of labor remuneration (in physi­
cal units) and the worker seeks to maximize income net of an 
index of disutility of labor. Output and the worker’s earnings 
are determined according to competitive rules. Assuming that 
the worker remains a wage taker the farmer would gain by 
paying the worker according to a different marginal pro­
ductivity schedule at a lower than optimum level of output.
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IV. conclusions
This highly selective review—or, more appro­
priately, this journey through a seemingly diverse 
literature—is intended to illustrate the dangers of 
making direct use of neoclassical tools in ana­
lyzing the hierarchical division of labor and its wel­
fare implications. Our main focus has been on how 
technology and forms of work organization are 
combined into patterns of job design which in turn, 
by «justifying» differential rewards can be used to 
preserve the stability of hierarchical relations and the 
controllability of the productive system. We took that 
side of the literature which maintains that neoclas­
sical theory is inadequate since it fails to capture 
the nature of the power of employers over employees— 
power that is institutionalized in contemporary 
foims of work organization. Furthermore, from our 
point of view it does not suffice to attribute to 
presence of externalities1 the inefficiency of the 
outcome of the development process for organiza­
tional forms.
Finally, it seems natural to ask for some concrete 
confirmation of the views we have supported in 
this essay. One possibility is to seek a link with the 
distribution of income for the following reason: 
to the extent that job structures and associated 
payment systems are devised to satisfy profit 
maximization, then job design may be seen as a de­
terminant of inequality in income. There is two 
fold empirical support for this contention: first, 
the distribution of income in the U.S. has failed to 
improve in the postwar period in spite of impres­
sive increases in the schooling and training of the 
labor force; second, many case studies have shown 
the unchanging character of industrial job structures. 
While most researchers have ascribed the problem 
of the income distribution to «deficiencies» in the 
supply of labor investigations of the role of the de­
mand for labor (alternatively, the supply of jobs) 
in the persistence of an inequitable distribution of 
income have been few. Among those few are Thu- 
row and Lucas [50] and Bowles and Gintis [10]. 
In both cases the problem of the distribution
1. There is a prima facie case for the presense of exter" 
nalties. First, the great variety of existing payment and in­
centive systems is significant [25; 41a; 57]. Not surprisingly, 
the motivational aspects of incentive systems tend to re­
flect prevalent social values. (This may well thwart produc­
tivity improvements but increases the stability of the system). 
Second, in all kinds of production there is indivisibility and 
joint production of output and training. This indivisibility 
precludes in most situations (as it is eloquently noted by Fitz­
Roy [19] a unique allocation of costs. Thus the remuner­
ation of labor may not reflect perfectly the acquisition of hu­
man capital. This, in turn, distorts the mechanism by which 
workers’ sovereignty registers on the development of or­
ganizational structures.
of income is viewed as a structural problem. Bow­
les and Gintis have provided a robust explanation 
of how inequality is associated with the hierarchi­
cal division of labor. That is, first by the way in 
which earnings are set for individuals occupying 
positions of differential authority and responsibil­
ity, and second, by the nature of job ladders and 
promotions [10, p. 84-100],
Our discussion has not spared suggestions for 
future research. We would like, however, to em­
phasize two routes: First, a generalized theory of 
the firm should deal with how the objective of 
profit maximization in the long-run is translated 
into trade-offs between efficiency and control­
lability of the productive system. An important 
part of the latter is how technological change is 
related to hierarchical structures. This might be 
facilitated by combining the «Babbage principle» 
with theories of natural selection [58]. Second, 
comparisons of different socioeconomic systems 
(characterized by differing degrees of income ine­
quality) may shed some light on the relationship 
between inequality and the social relations of pro­
duction in the modern economy [32].
Most immediate, however, is the question of the 
political and economic feasibility of workers’ con­
trol. This essay has emphasized the economic is­
sues but the political and the economic are intimate­
ly related. We need not stress the importance of 
the political side. Political and economic democracy 
cannot be thought if independently from each 
other, and industrial democracy is an essential in­
gredient of economic democracy.
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